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Abstract: Since the late 1990s, researchers have been predicting that the era of neu-
trality in aid politics is coming to an end and that foreign organizations will have 
to take a more engaged stance. Yet while the boundaries between humanitarianism 
and development are fading, in some cases the neutrality norm is actually expand-
ing rather than giving way to an engaged paradigm. Recognizing that the princi-
ples of neutrality and independence have diff erent meanings for diff erent actors 
and that they are applied in various ways, this article examines how the humanitar-
ian developers—small NGOs operating in Jonglei State in South Sudan—use these 
paradigms. Th e article shows that their specifi c variant of neutrality is not so much 
a pragmatic tool enabling operations in diffi  cult settings, but instead is a structural 
form of identity. In this variation, neutrality is not about the absence of a political 
stance, but about standing apart from social structures and social immunity. 
Keywords: development, foreign aid, humanitarianism, independence, neutrality, 
South Sudan, state
Neutrality and independence, along with hu-
manity and impartiality, constitute core human-
itarian principles. Th e humanitarian variant of 
neutrality, the one we know from Red Cross 
manifestos, was developed in the specifi c con-
text of 1864 and was built around the emerging 
order of nation-states. Th e humanitarian law es-
tablished at that time was a response to military 
confl icts and was designed to enable medical 
treatment of wounded soldiers. Th is dominant 
variant of neutrality means that humanitarian 
actors do not take sides in hostilities or engage 
in controversies of political, racial, religious, 
or ideological nature (Van Mierop 2015: 297). 
Originally it was proposed as a pragmatic tool 
for dealing with medical emergencies and as 
such was paired with the ideal of independence, 
which is defi ned as autonomy, an ability to freely 
determine one’s actions (299). Th ese practical 
principles, developed by means of a bottom-up 
process by medical practitioners and military 
offi  cers, became over time an elaborate ethical 
stance concerning scholars, thinkers, and the hu-
manitarian industry at large (Redfi eld 2011: 56). 
While neutrality grew to represent an om-
nipresent virtue and to signal altruistic justice, 
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the world to which these rules are supposed to 
apply has changed signifi cantly. Our world is 
no longer governed solely by nation-states, and 
the practice of war, its technologies, and partici-
pants vary considerably. Moreover, increasingly 
military operations include humanitarian ac-
tion as an explicit strategy for the transforma-
tion of confl icts and societies (Duffi  eld 2002, 
2007). Humanitarian action itself has also 
changed signifi cantly: nowadays it is rarely con-
cerned only with the saving of bare life (Ticktin 
2006; Agamben and Heller-Roazen 1998; Fassin 
2007). Medical assistance is just one element of 
its extensive repertoire. Finally, the separation 
of humanitarianism from development has pro-
gressively dissolved (Feldman 2011; Slim 2000). 
Amid this changing global political landscape, 
and changing modes of humanitarian assis-
tance, the issue of neutrality and independence 
is brought into question, with many debating 
whether it is possible and eff ective to maintain 
these principles in the twenty-fi rst century (Duf -
fi eld et al. 2001; P. O’Brien 2004; Slim 1997; Tor-
rente 2004). 
As Dorothea Hilhorst and Nadja Shmie-
mann (2002), as well as Peter Redfi eld (2011) 
have pointed out, even though neutrality is on 
virtually everybody’s lips, its meaning diff ers 
among actors and it is utilized for diff erent ends. 
So far, most of the discussion concerning these 
principles has occurred among, and been con-
ducted about, the most prominent players in the 
industry, such as the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC; Forsythe and Rieff er-
Flanagan 2016), Médicins Sans Frontières (MSF; 
Redfi eld 2011), or Cooperative for Assistance 
and Relief Everywhere (CARE; Feldman 2011; 
P. O’Brien 2004). But what about those less vo-
cal players that are populating the South with 
missions that are oft en singlehandedly governed 
by expatriates sent by a small North American 
or European nongovernmental organization 
(NGO)? Th ese organizations are oft en neglected 
in studies of humanitarianism. For this reason, 
I want to draw attention to them and to exam-
ine the social life of neutrality in their com-
pounds. How do they conceptualize it? When 
and how do they use it in practice? How does its 
meaning diff er from the dominant discourses, 
and how does it infl uence their activities on the 
ground? 
Th is article is based on observations of prac-
tices and interactions within three small NGOs, 
which between 2007 and 2008 were operating in 
Bor, the capital of Jonglei State in South Sudan, 
and which were solely managed by European 
and North American expatriates. For the pur-
poses of this article, I will call them “humani-
tarian developers.”1 As I will demonstrate, their 
understanding and usage of the principles of 
neutrality and independence diff ered consider-
ably from dominant views. For most of them, 
the issue of neutrality was a matter of structural 
identifi cation. In the cases described by Redfi eld 
(2006), neutrality is the paradigm used at a time 
when one must decide whether or not to take 
action (for instance, to become involved in ad-
vocacy). In the Jonglei of the late 2000s, neutral-
ity was not such an active choice, but rather a 
passive concept: humanitarian developers were 
neutral, not in their ethical choices and stances 
on political issues, but in their structural posi-
tioning. Th e “not taking sides” approach typical 
for the ICRC or MSF variant of neutrality, which 
was envisioned as a special attitude reserved for 
the most dramatic situations, was, in the case 
of these small NGOs, related to the expediency 
of avoiding relations with local authorities, and 
was used as a justifi cation for bypassing them. 
Th is framing was a result of the dissolving dif-
ference between humanitarianism and develop-
ment (Slim 2000). Th is article shows the con-
sequences of maintaining an emphasis on neu-
trality amid the changing landscape of foreign 
aid and the convergence of development and 
humanitarianism. I will present two case studies 
from the postwar, preindependence Jonglei State 
in South Sudan: one involves the relocation of 
international nongovernmental organizations 
(INGO) compounds from the city center to the 
distant outskirts of Bor; the other involves a 
scandal surrounding an article published in the 
Sudan Tribune criticizing the work of INGOs in 
Jonglei. Th e choice of the case studies is not in-
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cidental. Most writing concerning questions of 
neutrality and participation focus on the activi-
ties of the aid agencies that belong to their core 
mandate (Paulmann 2016). By shift ing the at-
tention from projects to the backstage of NGO 
activities, I want to demonstrate how strongly 
the ideals, which are set up for the very narrow 
context of humanitarian aid delivery, in fact in-
fi ltrate all diff erent aspects of aid workers’ lives. 
Th e events presented here took place shortly 
aft er the signing of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA). At that time Jonglei State, and 
its capital of Bor, was not fully disarmed and still 
experienced insecurity (A. O’Brien 2009). Ac-
cording to Small Arms Survey, most of the con-
fl icts were long-standing and stemmed from the 
civil war, but they were exacerbated by drought 
and food shortages, and related migration 
confl icts among pastoralist communities and 
between pastoralists and agriculturalists (Mc-
Evoy and LeBrun 2010: 21). Nevertheless, this 
period stood out as a relatively peaceful time. 
In the course of history, Bor, as the capital of 
one of the most politically important states, has 
become witness to atrocities of the Second Su-
danese Civil War: the rebellion of 1983, which 
led to the birth of the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement/Army, and the 1991 massacre of the 
Dinka tribesmen, in which estimated 2,000 civil-
ians were killed. Th e postindependence period 
has also been marked by ethnically motivated 
killings of Bor’s inhabitants. In this context, the 
short period post-CPA and preindependence 
stood out as particularly peaceful and optimis-
tic, with many hopeful South Sudanese (as well 
as Darfurians, Ethiopians, Ugandans, and Ken-
yans) repopulating the town and planning their 
lives and investments there. Th e boom and the 
development specifi c to that time is only one 
brief history amid the complicated and oft en 
dramatic history of that region. Under these 
circumstances, the separation between devel-
opment and humanitarian foreign aid becomes 
especially fl uid, which, as I will demonstrate be-
low, has a considerable impact on the way the 
relations between local authorities and foreign 
aid providers are shaped. 
Humanitarian principles of 
neutrality and independence 
and humanitarian developers
Th e expansion of INGOs in South Sudan since 
the 1990s was made possible through the (at 
least partial) abandonment of the neutrality 
paradigm. Th e provision of humanitarian aid 
and emergency food to the areas most aff ected 
by confl ict, namely, the regions controlled by 
the rebels in the long-running Second Sudanese 
Civil War, required reconsideration of issues of 
sovereignty, the right to intervene, neutrality, 
and independence (Levine 1997; Taylor-Rob-
inson 2002). Mark Duffi  eld (2002) and Volker 
Riehl (2001) have suggested that the events that 
took place at that time opened up possibilities 
for a major shift  in global aid politics, making 
room for the interventionist and engagement 
approach. Today, while South Sudan is again 
facing military unrest, and humanitarian crises 
in places like Syria are extreme, and debates over 
“the right to intervene” are becoming particularly 
relevant, the issue of neutrality seems to be one 
of the most pressing topics in aid circles (Red-
fi eld 2011). But interestingly, in the late 2000s in 
Jonglei, where many of these discussions were 
started, most organizations were still waving the 
neutrality fl ag, making it one of the most promi-
nent slogans of their mission statements. 
However, this attachment to the neutral-
ity and independence principles is particularly 
problematic in places such as Jonglei State, where 
the separation of humanitarianism and devel-
opment has been fl uid, with humanitarians oft en 
becoming developers. From the distant perspec-
tive of Europe, the area seems to be in a constant 
“state of urgency.” Since 1983, when Dr. John 
Garang de Mabior led a revolt in Bor and started 
the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and 
Army (SPLM/A), Jonglei and its capital became 
strategic in the military confl icts of South Su-
dan. Due to logistical limitations and wars the 
area oft en suff ered from shortages of food and 
other supplies. Th e state was in need of human-
itarian aid. But between 2007 and 2008, the area 
enjoyed relative stability and peace, and most 
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INGOs operating in this between-confl ict set-
ting were not involved in what is usually defi ned 
as emergency assistance. European and North 
American organizations discussed in this article 
moved in only once the fi ghting was over, once 
it was safe enough to operate. At that time, they 
were not dealing with life-and-death issues. In-
stead, they were preoccupied with projects that 
could easily be defi ned as development initia-
tives: drilling boreholes, building community 
centers, off ering vocational training, providing 
specialized assistance to disabled people. All 
these actions require an engaged approach that 
fosters relationships with various stakeholders: 
to achieve change, local politics must be taken 
into account and included in the process (P. 
O’Brien 2004). In fact, the maintaining of the 
neutrality paradigm in this context hinders the 
possibility of any meaningful partnerships with 
local communities that would enable sustain-
able eff ects. Yet, the aid workers operating in 
Jonglei in this post-CPA era rarely questioned 
the neutrality and independence paradigms. 
Relocation: Who is ruling in Bor? 
When I arrived in Bor in 2007,2 the town was 
fl ourishing. Even though there were only few 
permanent buildings in place, many constructed 
out of sheet iron and a mixture of wooden scaf-
folding and fabric, it was clear that the town was 
rapidly developing: people were making their 
way back home from their war-caused displace-
ment; shops, restaurants, and hotels were being 
opened; schools and administrative institutions 
were starting to operate; occasional festivities 
were organized in the main square. Th e town also 
became a host for several foreign aid organiza-
tions (INGOs) and United Nations (UN) agen-
cies. Most of them had their offi  ces in the town 
center. Renting plots of land from private own-
ers, they secured for themselves those few prop-
erties in town that were of brick-and-mortar 
construction. Still, the staff  themselves oft en lived 
in tents, as there was not enough housing in the 
area to facilitate any better accommodations. 
Among this international cohort was also a 
Polish organization—an INGO whose work was 
the main focus of my research. When I arrived, 
its compound was placed at the very outskirts of 
town, near the airstrip, in the area called Pak-
wawou. It was a new location. Th e INGO was 
previously based, like the other organizations, 
in the very center of Bor. Yet upon the request 
of the local administration it moved to this area, 
which according to the new town planning was 
designated as the center for agents of develop-
ment—INGOs, UN agencies, businesses, hotels, 
and so forth. Here spacious plots were made 
available for free; no rent was to be paid. How-
ever, the district was located in the middle of the 
bush; the land had to be cleared, and all facili-
ties needed to be built from scratch. Some plots 
were located by the main road, while others 
were positioned by roads that were only in the 
planning stage. Th ese hardships were, however, 
not unusual in South Sudan. Excluded from 
modernization schemes, the country was lack-
ing even the most basic infrastructure. 
Nonetheless, when I arrived in town, there 
were only two organizations that had actually 
moved to Pakwawou—the Polish one and the 
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organi-
zation (UNFAO). Th e speedy move of the Pol-
ish NGO was motivated by its poor fi nancial 
situation: the prospect of a rent-free offi  ce, even 
if it required some investment in construction 
work, was a welcomed one. Most other organi-
zations were planning to move sometime in the 
near future, yet no work was actually done to 
facilitate this. Among them was a small, western 
organization managed by three expatriates: Al-
ice, Jerome, and Nadya. Th ey were all living and 
working in a town center, in a compound with 
no permanent buildings and with tents serving 
as residential and offi  ce spaces. Th e plot they 
were off ered in Pakwawou was much more spa-
cious. But according to Alice and Jerome, their 
town location was more secure. 
Even though Pakwawou was in close proxim-
ity to the airstrip and the United Nation Mission 
in Sudan (UNMIS) base, where the Blue Hel-
mets were stationed, and from where they facil-
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itated shelter and evacuation in high-risk cases, 
it was also there where, just over the fence of the 
Polish compound, SPLA soldiers arranged their 
temporary settlement. In the month preceding 
my arrival some shootings had taken place. 
However, this was attributed to alcohol and un-
resolved animosities among the SPLA soldiers 
themselves, rather than to any confl ict-related 
fi ghting. Soon the soldiers moved out anyway, 
and the area became very quiet. Still no orga-
nization started any building works, as now the 
area seemed “too quiet” for some expatriates. 
While those living in town had all the facilities 
they needed within walking distance, the move 
to Pakwawou meant dependence on cars. Th ere 
were no shops or restaurants nearby. Th e dis-
trict was separated from the town center by a 
few kilometers. Th is was particularly problem-
atic when curfews prevented any pedestrian or 
car movement outside the town. 
Clearly, all these issues and personal prefer-
ences of the INGO personnel had an impact on 
their decision of whether or not to move. But 
as the main, offi  cial reason, Alice and Jerome 
pointed to the lack of an access road. Th eir plot 
was not designated by the main road. In vain 
they expected the government to provide access, 
while the authorities expected organizations to 
clear a road strip by themselves. Annoyed by the 
lack of progress in these matters, the authorities 
asked how it was possible that INGOs had no 
problem with paying high rents to private own-
ers, yet when they were getting their plots for 
free they could not aff ord to clear land for a road, 
but instead constantly placed demands on the 
state. For these authorities, the foreign organiza-
tions were resourceful agents who came to South 
Sudan to do development. Road building was 
considered a development matter, and therefore 
could (or should) not constitute a problem. Still, 
it proved to be a crucial issue in this case.
At the same time, the request to move, with-
out granting an access road, seemed to Alice 
and Jerome not only unreasonable, but almost 
like a forced displacement pushed forward by 
despotic authorities. Th ey argued that the au-
thorities were not in a position to give orders 
to their organization, because they were an 
NGO—a nongovernmental organization—and 
humanitarians. In this context, the “nongovern-
mental” was tightly linked with the notion of 
independence and neutrality. All characteristics 
were mentioned together, as if they were insepa-
rable twins. Neutrality was understood not as an 
active choice of refusing to support either side 
in an armed confl ict, but rather as a means of 
separation from the stakeholders. To follow the 
request of the local authorities was, in their es-
timation, equivalent to admitting accountability 
to them. It would also imply that this INGO 
was subsumed within local hierarchies. Even 
though at that time this NGO was not address-
ing humanitarian crises (local confl icts were in 
hibernation and people were hoping that the 
war times were behind them), ideas about neu-
trality were still infl uencing the behavior of the 
aid providers. 
At that time, Alice and Jerome were using 
the ethical power of neutrality to validate their 
choice to not be part of the existing power or-
der. Th eir choice was justifi ed by the implicit 
assumptions about the oppressive nature of the 
local elites. Th e high-ranking authorities were 
accused of having hostile attitudes. Irrespec-
tively of the actual state of aff airs, equipped with 
their own imported presumptions about what 
constitutes a good politician, foreign workers 
were calling up the military past of Sudanese 
leaders as evidence of their aggressive behavior 
and as an argument against fostering any col-
laboration. Th is was especially the case when 
Kuol Manyang was appointed as governor of 
Jonglei State. He took the position in 2007 amid 
expanding concerns about the growing inse-
curity in the area. I learned about his appoint-
ment from Jerome, who looked visibly worried 
about his arrival: “he has blood on his hands, 
he is ruthless … it will be tough.” For Jerome, 
Manyang was the embodiment of the typical 
“African ruler” who got into a position of power 
in unclear circumstances, and whose career was 
strongly linked to the military. 
Jerome got most of his information about the 
new governor from the local staff  of his NGO, 
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yet his employees had a rather diff erent per-
spective on this new appointment. Even though 
they were very well aware of Manyang’s career 
path, and were hoping for peace, they were not 
angered by the appointment of the new gover-
nor. Among them he had made himself known 
through his military background, and he had a 
reputation of being a strong political leader. He 
was from the area; he was one of those present 
in Bor County during the 1991 massacre, fi ght-
ing at the Garang site.3 As observed in the book 
by African Rights, Food and Power in Sudan, 
“[Military training] changed people’s minds. 
Untrained people seemed inferior. Civilian be-
came an insult” (1997: 82). For many of those 
South Sudanese who went through the years 
of war struggle, being a soldier, especially one 
with high rank, was associated with patriotism 
and was a sign of a strong personality—some-
one who was willing to fi ght for his people and 
the betterment of the country. Th at is why of-
ten these were the characteristics that people 
looked for in the Jonglei State leader in these 
diffi  cult times of insecurity and state building. 
Yet, many expatriates assigned a completely 
opposite meaning to this shift  in political power: 
for them, the personal and professional back-
ground of the new governor was not a marker 
of the qualities that could be helpful in leading 
the state during the time of crisis, but instead 
was interpreted as yet another example of un-
democratic, uncivilized standards governing 
the country. It worked as a further proof of the 
South Sudanese “militant culture.”4 In Man-
yang’s military background, what mattered was 
the mere fact of violence rather than the com-
plicated politics and histories behind it. Th e 
brutality of the local men was taken for granted, 
and simplifi ed as a “natural” result of war (Afri-
can Rights 1997; Gallagher 2009). 
Such a perception was informed by the logic 
of culture clashes (Huntington 1997). Expatriates 
operated according to the assumption that cul-
tural diff erences are both natural and unavoid-
able. Ankie Hoogvelt, who unpacks notions of 
“the new barbarism” and “the new racism” with 
regard to global economies, security issues, and 
the ways developers view internal African con-
fl icts (2001: 193–194), notes that foreigners view 
mutual diff erences as immutable, and of an in-
nate and nonrational quality that leads “inevi-
tably” to interethnic confl ict. Eva Spies (2016) 
confi rms these fi ndings, noticing that many aid 
workers face practical problems of understand-
ing the other. Eventually they avoid social re-
lations with local people, including elites. Th is 
observation could also apply in Bor, were many 
expatriates considered collaboration with local 
authorities diffi  cult. Of course, while carrying 
out their core mandate, that is, during project 
implementations, aid workers were obliged by 
the principles of participation. However, the 
consultations with local authorities were oft en 
their least favorite part of the job. Th is optic 
played an important role in shaping the relations 
between expatriates and local authorities in the 
case concerning this specifi c disagreement over 
the access road to the NGO plot in Pakwawou. 
Th e confl ict lasted for some nine months. 
With the end of the dry season and the improve-
ment of security in the region, the reorganiza-
tional works in the town took off  with new speed. 
Th e process of plot allocation accelerated. Th e 
city, which immediately aft er the war was sub-
jected to spontaneous resettlement, was now to 
become an organized structure. Special areas 
were designated for shopping and services, an 
administrative center, housing districts, and so 
on. Th e old market was closing down, and new 
shops were built just in the city center, where the 
western INGO was still based. Soon it was sur-
rounded by small shops and restaurants whose 
clients had to make their way by maneuvering 
between the organization’s large trucks parked 
in front of its offi  ce. Th e INGO’s presence in the 
area was clearly preventing some of the work in 
the market and in the larger-scale reorganiza-
tion and ordering of the town. Still, Jerome in-
sisted that they would not move to Pakwawou 
without having their wish of the access road 
granted. For him, the whole issue was an exam-
ple of the authorities’ absurd wishes—a demon-
stration of power—rather than a by-product of 
the town’s reforms and the development of Bor.
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Th en one day in April, while all of the ex-
patriates were in the fi eld on their regular du-
ties, city offi  cials and the police visited their 
compound. A couple of South Sudanese staff 
members who were present in the offi  ce were 
arrested on charges of not complying with the 
local town law and the eviction call. Upon their 
return to the offi  ce, and realizing what had just 
happened, Jerome and Alice were furious. For 
them it was the ultimate proof of the local au-
thorities’ aggressive attitudes, their inability to 
collaborate in a democratic manner—a fi nal ar-
gument that cooperation is impossible and any 
contact with local authorities should be limited 
to the minimum. Yet, at this point, fearing fur-
ther consequences, they fi nally decided to move 
into their new compound in Pakwawou. 
For nine months the expatriates resisted all 
requests for relocation by referring to their in-
alienable right of independence. At the same 
time, this situation was also an expression of the 
local state’s inalienable right of sovereignty. Ac-
cording to this logic, the creation of an INGO 
district far away from the city center could be 
interpreted as an attempt at decolonization (from 
all alien powers, including INGOs) and a pro-
cess of defi ning local leaders’ own spaces of au-
thority, as they were building state structures 
anew. But for many aid workers, these politics 
of space were an example of a power demon-
stration, irrational ambition, or a ruthless atti-
tude. It provided validation for the politics of 
separation practiced by the INGOs.5 Th e dis-
tancing from local authorities was validated by 
expatriates with what they saw as neutrality and 
independence paradigms. For them these ideals 
were part of their identifi cation as humanitari-
ans, and even though the Bor of 2007 and 2008 
was not in a state of urgency, and the work of 
aid workers consisted to a large extent of devel-
opmental endeavors, they did not want to let go 
of their ideals, which originally were created for 
diff erent realities. 
Th ese ideals prevented many small organi-
zations from engaging with the actual political 
problems on the ground and fostering an eff ec-
tive dialogue with local authorities. Eff ectively, 
their position in the hierarchies of power was 
kept ambiguous, with INGOs fl oating neither 
below nor above the state, but actually some-
where beyond local social structures. Ultimately, 
organizations acted as some sort of “fourth sec-
tor”—rather than a third sector, as they are un-
derstood to be in their home countries (Lewis 
2011). Importantly, their version of neutrality, 
as we can see in the case described above, man-
ifested through withdrawal from communica-
tion with the local authorities and techniques of 
avoidance. It was informed by a stereotypical, de-
monized perception of the ruling African elites. 
Women’s Day: Who is ruling 
in Jonglei State?
Th e original purpose of neutrality as a guid-
ing principle of humanitarian initiatives was to 
enable assistance and to secure access to com-
munities in crises. But in places like Bor, where 
humanitarian aid and development action were 
hardly separated, neutrality might become an 
obstacle rather than a facilitator in delivering 
aid. Th is is especially the case when neutrality 
becomes a way to exercise a politics of separa-
tion. Amid constant dependency on aid, South 
Sudanese have been striving for emancipation, 
not only from Khartoum but also from their re-
liance on foreign service providers. As has been 
pointed out by many authors (Igoe and Kellsal 
2004; Manji and O’Coill 2002; Moyo 2009), de-
pendence on foreign organizations is diffi  cult to 
accept. It takes away from local people and their 
leaders the ability to control social services; very 
oft en it forces states and communities to com-
ply with rules imposed by others. It weakens 
existing institutional capacities (for instance, by 
redirecting the most valuable individuals away 
from working for the state administration and 
into INGO employment), and with the mobile 
character of international players, it does not 
off er a sense of stability and sustainability. All 
these issues were certainly at play in Bor, and 
were important elements in relations between 
INGOs and the local state. 
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Th e frustration was aggravated by the con-
temporary politics of development, which are 
characterized by strong competition among 
international donors (Drążkiewicz 2013; Hat-
tori 2003). Th e ongoing generosity competition 
enforces aggressive visibility strategies. Eventu-
ally, places like Bor are turned into advertising 
billboards, with donor logos marking every cor-
ner. Th is constant reminder to whom the local 
people owe their water, schools, hospital, mar-
ket stalls, roads, sewing machines, laptops, and 
so forth, rather than generating feelings of grat-
itude, causes a sense of humiliation and frustra-
tion. Th is feeling was well depicted by the South 
Sudanese project coordinator in an American 
INGO. Th e funding for his project was part of 
fi nancial agreements between the Government 
of South Sudan (GOSS) and the World Bank, 
but due to GOSS’s lack of administrative ca-
pacities, the funding had to be channeled via a 
foreign NGO. As the South Sudanese manager 
of the large US-based NGO explained to me, 
this meant that the loan taken by GOSS from 
the World Bank now had to be transferred to 
the United States, and some portion of it had to 
be used to cover the administrative expenses of 
American offi  ces. Frustrated with the whole sit-
uation, he concluded his story, “I would like to 
go to New York and see if they have big GOSS 
logos on their laptops, desks, and cars—if they 
are forced to come to work in T-shirts saying: 
my salary is sponsored by the Government of 
South Sudan!” 
South Sudanese are constantly reminded to 
whom they owe their public services and in-
frastructure. Th e feelings of gratitude mix with 
the disempowering contestation of their own 
country’s capacities and the anger toward the 
exclusive lifestyles of expatriates, who enjoy the 
expensive hotels and restaurants inaccessible to 
most local people. It is therefore not surprising 
that their decolonizing attempts are aimed not 
only at Khartoum, but also at foreign institu-
tions. Trapped between cordial, dependency-
fueled gratitude for the work of foreign donors 
and the necessity to build a strong independent 
state, the authorities maneuver hard to shift 
their accountability between donors and their 
own home communities. 
An excellent example of such friction was the 
case of the Women’s Day celebration in Bor in 
March 2008. On this occasion, INGOs based in 
Bor received an invitation to the festivities or-
ganized on Freedom Square. Th e day was fi lled 
with various events: military and police parades, 
drama and traditional dance shows and speeches. 
Th e most important talk was given by Governor 
Kuol Manyang Jok. Th e speech was mostly in 
Dinka, interspersed with a few phrases in Ara-
bic. But there were moments when the governor 
spoke in English. In those few moments he cer-
tainly wanted to be well understood by the in-
ternational community. Th is was the case when 
he called for better cooperation between the 
state and INGOs. He pointed out that INGOs 
oft en neglected local structures and authorities, 
and while nobody really knew what they were 
doing, they were still present in the area. He 
expressed concern over the operational costs of 
foreign donors, noting that the money should 
go toward local communities and not foreign 
workers’ salaries. He called for more eff ective 
work with more sustainable eff ects. He said that 
those organizations that had no visible results 
of their work would have to leave the state. Like 
other parts of the speech, this statement was 
also welcomed by applause from the audience. 
Yet interestingly, it left  the expatriates present at 
the event feeling indiff erent. 
Th is changed a few days later with an article 
that was published in the Sudan Tribune. Wanda, 
the head of the Polish NGO, found out about it 
from her supervisor, Stefan, who was based in 
Warsaw. He was following Internet forums for 
aid workers operating in Sudan and spotted the 
discussion about the article there. He immedi-
ately contacted Wanda, suggesting that some-
thing has to be done, as the points made in the 
article seemed to be threatening organizational 
sovereignty:
March 9, 2008 (BOR, Jonglei)—Jonglei 
government will carry out a very tough 
check to the performance of non-govern-
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mental organizations (NGOs) and will 
be forced to dismiss idle organs, Gover-
nor Kuol has said. … Th e governor, in a 
speech he delivered on Women’s Day 
(March 8), has assigned the work of eval-
uating NGOs to his deputy Hassan Mar. 
Th e governor said NGOs [were] very idle 
or slow in their work but [they] deceived 
… [no-one]. Th ey fl y over us in planes but 
you do not [know] what they are doing! 
Mr.  Manyang bitterly said, causing UN 
agency representatives at the rally to take 
on dejected faces. … But the major ques-
tions NGOs in Jonglei need to answer 
include: why they stay in one compound 
… thus taking a low number of casual 
workers, their failure to complete projects 
on time, and employment of foreigners as 
their staff  in Jonglei. It will be a sad Eas-
ter holiday for some NGOs and/or staff . 
(Aleu 2008)
Th e article referred to several INGOs and UN 
agencies by name, among them the Polish one. 
On the day of the publication the Pakwawou 
compound of the Polish NGO was visited by 
Isabella, head of the mission of another orga-
nization. She was visibly aggravated. “Wanda, 
have you seen this? Have you seen the article?” 
she said to her Polish colleague. Isabella was 
not present at the Women’s Day celebration, 
so she had no chance to learn about the gov-
ernor’s speech fi rsthand. She treated this piece 
of journalistic writing as the offi  cial statement 
of the Jonglei administration. She assumed that 
the words of the journalist—“It will be a sad 
Easter holiday for some NGOs”—constituted 
a threat by the state representative toward aid 
organizations and foreign workers. She quickly 
interpreted the piece in a way that fi t with for-
eign aid workers’ opinions about local leaders, 
defi ning them as ungrateful and authoritarian. 
Th e same stereotypes about Jonglei authori-
ties that fueled the confl ict over the relocation 
seemed to be now confi rmed in the article. But 
fi rst and foremost Isabella saw the article as a 
transgression of the existing code of conduct. 
According to her, the words of the governor (as 
quoted in the article) were not just threatening a 
particular organization, but the most important 
pillars of the aid industry, that is, neutrality and 
nongovernmentality. Again, the two qualities 
were made inseparable, and were referred to as 
part of one phenomenon. In this context they 
were perceived as a sort of immunity, lift ing aid 
workers out of the local social stratifi cation. But 
contrary to Isabella’s expectations, Wanda was 
reluctant to do anything. Instead, she suggested 
answering the concerns of the government and 
the journalist. She proposed working on better-
ing relations with the government and organiz-
ing informational meetings with the authorities 
and general public to talk about the work done 
by the INGOs. Her reaction was not the one ex-
pected by Isabella. Eventually, she left  the Polish 
compound without agreeing on what (if any-
thing) should be done. In time, emotions cooled 
down and the whole issue was soon forgotten. 
Easter turned out to be calm and relaxing, 
and no action was ever taken against foreign 
NGOs. Also, no action was ever taken by the aid 
workers to address the article. Still, the confl ict 
over the article’s content showcases very well the 
friction between the INGOs and the state. It also 
illuminates how these problems are linked to the 
idea of neutrality: the power it holds in the aid 
industry, and the specifi c meaning that makes it 
a structural, rather than ethical concept. For aid 
workers such as Isabella, neutrality is the pre-
rogative of the aid community. It is perceived as 
an inalienable right rather than an ethical, radi-
cal choice made in times of crisis. Consequently, 
neutrality continues to be perceived as the main 
pillar of the industry, even in the face of realities 
such as those of Bor, which do not easily fi t into 
the category of either humanitarian or develop-
ment spaces. Linked inextricably with another 
powerful concept shaping the aid industry—
nongovernmentality—neutrality becomes per-
ceived as a sort of immunity providing aid work-
ers with protection and exemption from so-
cial stratifi cation. Unlike the active version of 
neutrality described by Redfi eld (2006), which 
requires active choices about the role aid work-
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ers want to play in given crises, this structural 
version of neutrality is passive. It is built and 
validated on the existing topographies of power 
that describe states, in particular African states 
and their leaders, as oppressive rulers. 
Wanda’s attempt to challenge this prevailing 
narrative visibly annoyed other expatriates. Her 
unwillingness to subscribe to notions that de-
scribe the world through the binary opposition 
of state versus nonstate, INGOs versus author-
ities, came as a surprise. For Isabella, Wanda 
seemed to be a naïve rookie aid worker who 
understood little about the world of foreign aid. 
But in fact, Wanda’s stance was carefully thought 
through and resulted from her previous profes-
sional experiences. Before taking a job in South 
Sudan, Wanda was employed by a state institu-
tion. In Poland she was considered a “state bu-
reaucrat” and was oft en depicted as a villain 
(on state-nonstate confl ict in Poland, see Drąż-
kiewicz 2016). She frequently experienced the 
presumptions made by NGOs about their state 
counterparts and felt them to be damaging and 
unfair. She understood fi rsthand how crucial 
it is to build a trusting relationship between 
NGOs and the state administration in order to 
accomplish any social change. Now, in Bor, even 
though she was working on the “other side” in a 
completely diff erent country, dealing with dif-
ferent issues, she recognized the old patterns of 
behavior far too well, and she did not want to 
contribute to the reproduction of such a nega-
tive structural relationship. Th at is why, when 
Stefan and Isabella used neutrality as an argu-
ment to support their stance, she had diffi  cul-
ties in subscribing to the notion. Although what 
was happening in Bor was strikingly similar to 
what she had known in Warsaw, Wanda noted 
that, in Warsaw, no one could claim “neutrality,” 
since the term is reserved for confl ict zones: in-
stead they talk about being “apolitical,” while in 
fact both in Jonglei and in Poland they are just 
antistate. 
Th e confl ict over the newspaper article shows 
how the neutrality paradigm is considered not 
just an antipolitical stance (Ferguson 1994), but 
also an antistructural position that lift s stake-
holders out of social obligations. As the cases 
described above reveal, such a stance might vali-
date some states’ complaints about foreign agents 
infi ltrating their societies as a destabilizing force. 
While the act of separation is conducted by aid 
workers in the name of neutrality, this motiva-
tion remains unclear for the local authorities. 
What they see is simply lack of accountability. 
Coupled with the aggressive visibility strategies 
of donors, and their exclusive lifestyles, this 
specifi c version of neutrality risks generating 
confl icts rather than limiting them. For the lo-
cal authorities who already struggle to maintain 
control over services that should be in their 
domain, the attitude of foreign organizations 
suggesting their entitlement to social immunity 
does not go unnoticed. 
Final comments
As the evidence from Jonglei suggests, today 
neutrality has more than a single meaning. 
As Mark Duffi  eld, Joanna Macrae, and Devon 
Curtis (2001) have pointed out, humanitarian 
assistance, with its emphasis on neutrality and 
independence, cannot fi ll the void of eff ective 
political engagement. Th e growing complex-
ity of aid requires aid workers to adjust their 
stance on humanitarian principles and to fi nd 
new ways of being in the world. But the evi-
dence presented here suggests that many hu-
manitarian developers still choose to maintain 
paradigms designed in very diff erent times and 
for dealing with diff erent realities. As the hu-
manitarian and development worlds converge, 
so do their main characteristics. Th e neutrality 
of humanitarians and the nongovernmentality 
of development NGOs thus become wedded to 
each other. Th is new positioning of neutrality 
impacts upon the meaning of the concept, and 
the ways in which it is applied. Instead of the 
original utilitarian and pragmatic tool that al-
lowed aid workers to avoid “taking sides,” this 
new variation of neutrality is understood as a 
way of being beyond existing sides. Such a fram-
ing allows organizations to escape accountabil-
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ity to local state structures, but at the same time 
to remain accountable to donors in Europe and 
North America, where the issue of neutrality is 
still treated as a virtue (which explains the in-
volved reaction of the Warsaw headquarters of 
the Polish NGO to an article in a South Suda-
nese newspaper). 
Paradoxically, in spite of the dominant par-
ticipatory approach to development, humani-
tarian developers described in this article use it 
to refrain from close cooperation with the gov-
ernment (as we saw in the case of relocation), 
or to reject its particular requests for account-
ability (such as those verbalized on Women’s 
Day). Ultimately, neutrality becomes associated 
with social immunity. As we saw in the case 
of the INGO relocation, by applying this new 
paradigm uncritically, aid workers risked be-
coming antidevelopmental in their actions: the 
compound of the NGO that was ignoring relo-
cation pressures was obstructing development 
work in the city center. Furthermore, such an 
approach can be seen as contradictory to par-
ticipatory approach. As the case of Women’s 
Day reveals, the new neutrality paradigm en-
ables aid providers to dismiss local authorities’ 
wishes, and to treat them as manifestations of 
unjustifi ed power rather than a way to exercise 
self-determination and ownership over local 
development. Ultimately, it distances INGOs 
from their ideal of development collaboration 
and brings them closer to the charity model of 
operating, where people are expected to remain 
passive and grateful. Yet the questioning of this 
specifi c variant of neutrality becomes particu-
larly diffi  cult: while it is used in the new world 
of humanitarian developmentalism and gains 
new meaning, it still holds the old power of eth-
ical humanitarianism, allowing aid workers to 
claim higher moral standards. Moreover, as in 
this new context neutrality is no longer simply 
a tool, an operational approach, but instead be-
comes a sort of identity, its abundance and crit-
icism provoke defensive reactions, suggesting 
that this new approach might be here to stay, 
regardless whether it is productive or not.
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Notes
 1. In an eff ort to protect the identities of my infor-
mants and their organizations, especially amid 
the ongoing violent confl icts in South Sudan, I 
have changed the names of my informants, and 
also intentionally limited descriptions of the 
NGOs and their activities. 
 2. My presence in South Sudan was linked to 
the research I was conducting on Polish aid to 
Africa. I negotiated my access to the fi rst Polish 
permanent aid offi  ce in Sudan, and conducted 
extensive participant observation there by agree-
ing to contribute to its work and become its un-
paid administrative offi  cer. I stayed with the or-
ganization for seven months, and in that time I 
could closely observe how the events described 
in this article unfolded. I discussed their mean-
ings with their participants in numerous con-
versations and interviews, in which my research 
partners had a chance to refl ect upon the real-
ities they observed and shaped on the ground. 
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 3. Since 1990, Garang’s leadership was questioned. 
Th is led to the 1991 split within the SPLA and 
the establishment of the SPLA-Nasir faction, led 
by Riek Machar. Th e region was caught up not 
only in the war with the government in Khar-
toum, but also in South-on-South violence. In 
October and November 1991, Nuer forces drove 
into Bor Dinka country, Garang’s homeland, 
brutally killing hundreds of civilians in Bor and 
committing violent atrocities in Kongor. Up to 70 
percent of the population was displaced. Th ose 
who remained in the area faced famine, as most 
of their livestock had been stolen or slaughtered. 
Th e events became known as the Bor Massacre. 
In March 1993, the mainstream SPLA, under 
the command of Kuol Manyang Juk,  attacked 
Kongor and succeeded in driving out the SP-
LA-Nasir forces. Reportedly between sixty and 
eighty-one people, the majority of them civilians, 
were killed during the fi ghting. To this date the 
events of the early 1990s constitute an important 
part in the commemorative history of the South 
Sudanese people and continue to infl uence the 
public perception of those who, like Manyang or 
Machar, participated in them (Hutchinson 2001; 
Human Rights Watch 1994). 
 4. Th is antimilitary attitude was also visible in 
the employment preferences of foreign NGOs. 
Some expatriates were not willing to hire people 
who openly admitted their military background. 
 5. Th e resistance to cooperating with the state was 
also visible in other domains, for instance, tax-
ation. When GOSS started to execute personal 
income tax, some expatriates expressed suspi-
cion toward the scheme and were considering 
avoiding the responsibility to pay contributions 
for their local staff . 
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